Information Economics: Course Outline

Instructor: Dr.Yongqin Wang

Information Economics, also called contract theory or incentive theory is the study of economic behaviors under asymmetric information. This course will introduce the state-of-the-art of information economics and will stress on economics intuition and economic applications in labor market, financial market, product market, industrial organization, regulation, organization economics and other relevant fields.

The outline of the course

1. Introduction

2. Adverse Selection: General Theory

3. Adverse Selection: Extensions and Applications

4. Signaling Models

5. Moral Hazards: General Theory

6. Moral Hazards: Extensions and Applications

7. The Dynamics of Complete Contracts

8. Incomplete Contracts: General Theory

9. Incomplete Contracts: Applications

10. Conclusion

Class hours: 36

Credits: 2

Classroom: RM3101

Time: 8:00-9:30 a.m., Tuesday (this semester)

Main Reference:

Bernard Salanie, 1998: The Economics of Contracts, MIT Press

(The texts can be bought from Mr. Shen Jianhua at school of economics)

Laffont and Martimort, 2002: The Theory of Incentives, Princeton University Press