陆 洲：Anti-Corruption Mechanism and Screening Buy-Out Contracts

 

现代经济学系列讲座第223期

 

 

 

题目：Anti-Corruption Mechanism and Screening Buy-Out Contracts

 

     陆 洲 博士

 

     The City College of New York

 

 

  时间：2009年12月15日13：30-15：00

 

地点：复旦大学经济学院710会议室

 

摘要：  This paper examines the information asymmetry problem of selling a …rm in a situation, where an agent, delegated by the seller to sell a fi…rm, may take bribe from the buyer ending up with a deal against the seller's interest. Selling a public rm to private investors through an official is a good example of this situation. To formalize the situation, a hybrid model of adverse selection and moral hazard is provided. An essential hypothesis of the model is that there exists an ex􀀀post anti-bribery mechanism composed of bribery investigation and bribery punishment. The positive analysis shows that a corrupt agent, by demanding bribe from buyers, can use a combination of buy-out price and bribe payment as a screening mechanism to elicit private information from the buyer. Normative analysis shows that bribery may cause insufficient ex􀀀post managerial incentives, which further implies that in the presence of corruption privatization of public …rms may not necessarily improve the …firm's performance. The model also predicts that realized pro…t level increases with buy-out price and a more capable buyer is less subject to bribery.